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THE FoRDAm LAW REVIEW joins in respectful tribute to our late
Regent, Reverend John X. Pyne, S.J. His inspiration, interest and
enthusiasm were always at the service of the REVIEW. The memory of
his sterling and independent spirit will long remain with us.

COMMThENTS
QUASI-CONTRACTS--RELATIONSHIPS

RAISING PRESUBPTION OF GRATUTn.-

3
Fusing in varying degrees the elements of contract,' tort,2 and equity, quasi-

contracts may properly be termed a legal hybrid. Since the only forms of
action at early common law were those in tort, debt, and contract, if the
wrong sustained by a plaintiff did not come within such categories and was
not sufficient to justify a bill in equity, he was left without a remedy.4 To
correct this inequitable situation the remedy of implied in law contract came
into being, having its foundation in natural justice and arising for the purpose
1. Like contracts, quasi-contracts are enforced by means of the remedy of assrmpsil.
Again, quasi-contracts and contracts are based upon particular dealings between involved
parties giving rise to a positive duty; in both instances the parties defendant are required
to act rather than forebear. Ames, History of Asumpsit (1888) 2 HAv. L. REv. 53, 63;
WooDwmm, QUAsr-CoNTRACS (1913) 6. The notable difference, of course, between quasicontracts and contracts is that a quasi-contract is imposed by law whereas a contract is based
upon a consensual relation.
"In truth, it [quasi-contract] is not a contract or promise at all. It is an obligation
which the law creates, in the absence of any agreement, when and because the acts of the
parties or others have placed in the possession of one person money, or its equivalent, under
such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it, and which
ex aequa et bono belongs to another." Miller v. Schloss, 218 N. Y. 400, 407, 113 N. E.
337, 339 (1916).
2. A quasi-contract smacks of tort in that it is essentially non-contractual. It differs
from a tort in that it gives rise to a particular duty to act as distinguished from a general
L.
duty to withhold action. Langdell, Classification of Rights and Wrongs (1900) 13 Hv.
REv. 537, 542-545. The tortious defendant is usually punished because he acted (e.g.,
negligently injured the plaintiff); whereas the defendant in a quasi-contractual action is
liable because he did not act (e.g., failure to return money paid by mistake). WooowAn,
QuAsi-CoNAcrs (1913) 8.
3. The distinguishing characteristic of quasi-contractual relations is the eszential equitable approach to the solution of the problem. Charged with principles of justice, fair play
and morality, the body of quasi-contract law is permeated with the flexibility which predominates in the field of equity. The restriction of remedy to money judgments and the
enforcement of such remedy in a court of law mark the differences between quasi-contractual and equitable relief.
4. Woods et at. v. Ayres, 39 Mfich. 345 (1878); KEEE, QuAs-Counecrs (1893) 14.
For an excellent summary of the development of quasi-contract see REsTTE E,;T, RsmTunox (1937) 3-6.
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5
of preventing the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of another.
So where a benefit was conferred by one party upon another, who was thereby unjustly enriched, the courts invented he fiction that the two had entered
into a contract, 6 even though the beneficiary never expected to reimburse
1
the plaintiff and indeed even where he deliberately intended the contrary.
Thus was the plaintiff brought within the expanding remedy of indcbitatus
assumpsit and the defendant made liable to him for the reasonable value of
the benefits which he, the defendant, had received. 8 It is important to note
that quasi-contract is distinctly a creature of the law and has an entirely
separate existence from the implied in fact contract, which necessarily embodies a meeting of the minds and an actual agreement.0 An implied in fact
contract differs from an express contract not in kind, but merely in the mode
of proof; 10 in an implied in law contract there is neither a promise to recom-

S. Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Reprints 676 (1760); KFXrN, QUASICoNRAs (1893) 16; 1 WILLSTON, CONTRAcrS (2d ed. 1936) § 36a. Although unjust enrichment is the general basis of the implication it is not exclusive. The law sometimes
enforces a duty to restore a plaintiff to a former status, not merely to surrender a benefit
which the defendant has received. 1 WIrJuSTON, CONTRACTs § 3; REsTATEmXENT, RESTITUTION (1937) § 1 (e).
6. The necessity of conferring a benefit in such cases is brought out in Credit Alliance
Corp. v. Sheridan Theatre Co., 241 N. Y. 216, 149 N. E. 837 (1925). Plaintiff was a credit
company from whom the president of defendant company borrowed money, allegedly for
defendant's use. The president gave the plaintiff a promissory note of defendant's signing
his own name and forging the other necessary signature. In return for which he took back
a check payable to defendent which he deposited in defendant's bank account. He then
drew a check to his own order and used the money for his own purposes. The court refused to allow plaintiff to recover stating: "The money having been immediately withdrawn
by Spiegel and converted to his own use without the corporation's knowledge of the transaction or that the funds had even been placed to its credit, it enjoyed no benefit and exercised no dominion over the same." Credit Alliance Corp. v. Sheridan Theatre Co., 241
N. Y. 216, 221, 149 N. E. 837, 838 (1925).
7. The intent to contract is lacking where a suit is brought by a doctor for emergency
services rendered to an employee of a corporation. Weinsberg v. St. Louis Cordage Co.,
135 Mo. App. 553, 116 S. W. 461 (1909). Those cases wherein there is not only lacking an
intent but a positive mental attitude to the contrary are set forth thus by Blackstone: "If
any one cheats me with false cards or dice, or by false weights and measures, or by selling
me one commodity for another, an action on the case also lies against him for damages
upon the contract, which the law always implies, that every transaction is fair and honest."
3 Br.. Coiu& *165.
8. Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Reprints 676 (1760). For such damages
the plaintiff was allowed to recover on the common counts, e.g. quantum mneruit, money
paid, services rendered, and goods received. The remedy of indebitatus assumpslt Is Itself
a hybrid, resulting from a combination of actions in debt with actions of assumpsit. WoonwArn, QuAsI-CoNTPACrS (1913) 3.
9. Columbus, H. V. & T. Ry. v. Gaffney, 65 Ohio St. 104, 61 N. E. 152 (1901); Hertzog
v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465 (1857). In the latter case the court classified quasi-contracts as
"constructive" and implied in fact contracts as "implied", which would seem to be a less
confusing method of distinction.
10. An implied in fact contract is established through a study of the conduct of the
parties viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances. Express contracts are proved by
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pense the plaintiff nor is there in any real sense an agreement between the
parties."
The necessary elements to the quasi-contract are, therefore, the sustaining
of a benefit by the defendant, 12 and the suffering of an injustice by the plaintiff.' 3 Under these requirements, it follows that where the plaintiff is merely
performing a gratuitous act,' 4 the law will refuse to presume that there is an
implied in law contract. Where, therefore, from the very relationship existing
between the parties, whether fiduciary, commercial, societal or family, it is
customary to render such reciprocal or unilateral acts of kindness of courtesy,
then there will be no contract implied in law."
Our problem is the consideration of those relationships which will impel
the law to refuse to create a contract even though the circumstances and events
reveal an enrichment. The relationships wherein the presumption of reimbursement is absent-in whole or in part-are the following: I. Family Relationships; H. Commercial Relationships; and MI. Societal Relationships.
I.

FAiy RELATIONSHIPS

As a necessary preliminary to this, the most litigated branch of the subject,
the actual meaning of the word "family" should be considered. The Roman
law, under its broadest concept, designated as members of the favni!ia-from
which our English word "family" is derived'G-all those who were under the
dominion of the pater-familias,17 or chief of the house, and included all others
showing the oral or written terms of the agreement. Columbus, H. V. & T. Ry. v. Gaffnzy,
65 Ohio St. 104, 61 N. E. 152 (1901) ; KExa=, QuAsi-Co.N-=crs (1893) S.
11. Balkan v. Buhl, 158 Alinn. 271, 197 N. W. 266 (1924), 35 A. L. R. 470 (1925).
12.

See note 6, supr.

13. Dallman v. Frank, 1 Cal. App. 541, 82 Pac. 564 (1905); James v. O'Driscoll, 2 Bay
101, 1 Am. Dec. 632 (S.C. 1798). In neither of these cases Nus there an intent at the time
the services were rendered to submit a bill therefor. Plaintiff consequently failed to recover.
But in Christianson v. McDermott's Estate, 123 Mlo. App. 448, 100 S. W. 63 (1907), ervices which had been performed in expectation of reimbursement through the beneficiary's
will, were allowed to form the basis of an action in'quasi-contract, despite the fact that
the compensation had not been provided in the form expected, the court holding nonetheless
that plaintiff's intention to recover in some form was sufficient for purposes of this suit.
14. Silano v. Carosella, 272 Mlass. 203, 172 N. E. 216 (1930); Cicotte v. St. Anne's
Church, 60 Mlich. 552, 27 N. W. 682 (1886). The following cases seem to stand for the
proposition that where services rendered are for the mutual benefit of both parties, the
one performing may not recover thereon. In re McCarthy Portable Elevator Co., 196 Fed.
247 (D. D. N. J. 1912), aff'd, 201 Fed. 923 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1913); Jones v. Clk,28 Iowa 593
(1870); Palmer v. Haverhill, 98 Alass. 487 (1863); Rogers v. Westfall, 95 W. Va. 78, 120
S. E. 191 (1923). However, this is probably considered as evidence of an intent not to
charge compensation for services.
15. Fitzgerald & Mallory Construction Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S.98 (1890) (commercial
relationship); Spadoni v. Giaconnazi, 27 Cal. App. 149, 149 Pac. 51 (1915) (friendly relationship); Winkler v. Killian, 141 N. C. 575, 54 S. E. 540 (1906) (family relationship).
16. RADir, Ro A= LAw (1927) § 39.
17. CAITPBELL, ComuFNDrum or Rom.='r LAw (2d ed. 1892) 16-17.
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living together under the family roof.18 Although the Canon Law does not
9
specifically define what is meant by the "family,"' scholastic philosophy, concerned with morals, treats it as a social group consisting of father, mother and
children.20 The early Anglo-Saxon law of England recognized a term familia
21
which described the measure of ground occupied by a man and his family,
which included all the inhabitants of his household and thus resembled the
Roman law definition. As to the word "family" itself, while recognizing that
the term was susceptible to varying and elastic interpretations, depending upon
what phase of the law was concerned, 22 later English courts regarded it as
2
comprising all those who lived under the same roof with the pater-amilas.3
Turning now to the precise question herein involved, namely the meaning
of "family" for the purpose of the law of quasi-contracts, it becomes apparent
that the broader definition of the term "family" is that applied. How else
24
to explain the declarations of the courts that strangers to blood, or those
25
may still live in the "family"
remotely related through blood or affinity
relation? Even under the more liberal construction of the term, however,
there is no room for the inclusion of boarders or any 2others occupying rooms
in a house under some financial or other arrangement. 6
Once a family relationship is established, then services rendered 'by one
member of a family to another are deemed to have been gratuitous and the
courts refuse to apply the general rule that valuable services rendered by one
party for another's benefit have been so performed in contemplation of some
compensation therefor. 27 And the reason for this rule is that such human
HUNTER, INTRODUCTION TO Romm LAW (New ed. 1921) 27; RAN, RoMrAN LAW
§ 39.
19. An examination of the following authorities failed to disclose a definition of the
word "family": AuGusTINE, Comm NTARY ON THE NEW CODE OF THE CANON LAW (4th ed.
18.

(1927)

1921); AYRiNHAC, CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH IN THE NEW CODE OF CANON LAW (1925);
CICoGNANI, CANON LAW (1934); WOYWOOD, PRACTICAL COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF TmE

CANON LAW (1925).
20. 2 MERCIER, MANUAL OF MODERN SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY (3rd ed. 1923) 316.
21. 2 HOI.DSWORTu, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1927) 64.
22. Pigg v. Clarke, 3 Ch. D. 672 (1876).
23. "In common parlance, the family consists of those who live under the same roof
with the pater-familias, those who form (if I may use the expression) his fireside". Kenyon,
C. J. in King v. Inhabitants of Darlington, 4 T. R. 797, 800, 100 Eng. Reprints 1308, 1309
(K. B. 1792).
24. See note 41, infra.
25. See notes 47, 48, 49, infra.
26. Wallace v. Schaub, 81 Md. 594, 32 AtI. 324 (1895) (boarder). That the purpose
for which a party comes into the plaintiff's home is the dominant consideration In determining whether he or she is to become a member of the family is borne out by Wence v.
Wykoff, 52 Iowa 644, 3 N. W. 685 (1879), where plaintiff's invalid mother-in-law requested

him to take her into his home specifically to care for her in her old age, having expressed
a desire to reimburse him. The court held that no family relationship had ever come
into being. In Gordan v. Wyness, 169 App. Div. 659, 155 N. Y. Supp. 162 (2d Dep't
1915), the court held that an agreement whereby plaintiff was to keep defendant's child
until it reached full age did not constitute the child a member of plaintiff's family.
27. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 204 Ky. 745, 265 S. W. 301 (1924); Hapke v. Hapke, 93
Okla. 180, 220 Pac. 660 (1923); Riley v. Riley, 38 W. Va. 283, 18 S. E. 569 (1893).
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relationship is the fountain head for the performance of spontaneous benefits
based upon motives of love and affection; that people living together under
such circumstances generally pool their resources and energies to work together for the common good. 28 The law then merely recognizes what natural
sentiment and common experience have shown to be the case: that members
of the same family do not as a rule attach a monetary value to their mutual
services.
A natural query at once arises: what kind of services will be presumed to
have been gratuitously rendered and what kind will be presumed to have been
performed in expectation of reimbursement? If the family relationship is the
dominant consideration in testing out these presumptions, then it would seem
that only those services which would naturally be interchanged between members of the same family should be considered. But the courts have not probed
this question very deeply. The majority of the courts content themselves
with deciding from all the facts in the case before them whether the services
and the circumstances under which they were rendered are such that the parties
must have intended a contract. 29 Kentucky, however, has attempted to provide a judicial yardstick by setting up the test of whether or not the services
are of a "personal" nature 30 allowing recovery only for those which are not.
This measuring rod has produced a strange effect. One would expect that
the washing and mending of clothes would be of the type of work that members of a family would cheerfully discharge without any thought of recompense,
and yet they have been held to be impersonal services and therefore no bar
to recovery. 1 The difficulty inherent in an ambiguously worded test, such as
that of "personal" services, should deter other courts from adopting it. Certainly the majority rule which looks at all the aspects of the case, although
more flexible, is preferable. Offsetting the lack of certainty is the advantage
of allowing the courts to weigh up the precise facts of each case in terms of
equity and justice. 2
A. Parent and Child
It would seem that this basic relationship of parent and child, the very
foundation of the social order,53 with its ties of blood and the love, affection
28. Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465 (1857). As the court points out in this case, the
position of a son in the family is certainly on a higher plane than that of a mere hired
servant and a fusion of a parent-child with a master-servant relationship is rare.
29. Lowery v. Pritchett, 204 Ala. 328, 85 So. 531 (1920); Fuller v. Fuller's Estate,
21 Ind. App. 42, 51 N. E. 373 (1898); Cowan v. Musgrave, 73 Iowa 384, 35 N. W. 496
(1887); Davis v- Gallagher, 55 Hun 496, 9 N. Y. Supp. 11 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
30. Fralley v. Thompson's Adm'rs, 20 Ky. 220, 49 S. W. 13 (1904). It is difficult to
comprehend exactly what is meant by the word "personaF as employed by the courts
in such instances. In a subjective sense all services performed out of affection may be so
classified. In an objective sense it would -eem to include solely services to the pernson
and would be exemplified by nursing services. If there is any merit in the so-called
"personal" service test, it should be most liberally construed and extend to allsprvices
customarily performed within the domestic circle.
31. Dance's Adm'r v. Magruder, 26 Ky. 220, 80 S. W. 1120 (1904).
32. Sawyer v. Hebard's Estate, 58 Vt. 375, 3 At. 529 (1886).
33. The parent-child relation is truly the keystone of our society. The ties existing be-
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and sacrifice resulting therefrom, would be sufficient to negative any implication that the parties thereto performed reciprocal services in expectation of
a reward. Such, however, is not the case. The majority of the courts refuse
to apply the presumption on the fact of relationship alone, but demand something more; i.e., a living together. As Keener states: "This rule does not depend, as is so often stated, upon the relationship of parent and child, but
upon the household relationship existing between the parties."3 4 Thus, the
majority of jurisdictions hold that where a child leaves his parent's fireside
and establishes himself independently as head of his own family, then services
rendered by him to his parent are deemed to have been performed in fulfillment of an implied in law contract.3 5 As to what constitutes a breaking off
of the household relation, the courts have laid down no definite rules. Inferentially they support the principle that the child must be permanently removed
from the dominion of the parent. The importance of this removal of the
father's dominion seems to be the keystone of this breaking off of the household relation, rather than other alleged requirements such as the living in a
separate house, or the paying of his own rent. This would appear to be borne
out by the fact that even where a son has continued to reside in his parent's
house, if he acts as the head of his own separate family within that house,
then the relationship of which Keener speaks, no longer exists and the services
are considered as having been carried out in return for compensation 3 0 An
actual physical departure from the parent's house would seem, therefore, not
to be required.
A minority of cases refuse to apply this household test, placing their decisions squarely upon the parent-child relationship.37 One of these cases holds
that the absence of a living together weakens but does not destroy the presumption that services rendered among members of the same family are pretween parent and child operate as natural factors to promote the cohesiveness of this
basic unit and comprise part of nature's plan for the perpetuation of the race. Cao=m,
TH ScIE sCOF Eiarrcs (1917) 388.
34. Kx~nm, QuAsx-CoNTRAcrs (1893) 319n. To the same effect see WOODWAID, QUASICoxTcs (1913) § 51.
35. Butler v. Kent, 152 Ala. 594, 44 So. 863 (1907); Wilsey v. Franldin, 57 Hun 382,
10 N. Y. Supp. 833 (1890); Marion v. Farnan, 68 Hun 383, 22 N. Y. Supp. 946 (1893);
Ellis v. Cox, 176 N. C. 616, 97 S. E. 468 (1918); Steel v. Steel, 12 Pa. St. 64 (1849) ;
Mathias v. Tingley, 39 Utah 561, 118 Pac. 781, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 749 (1911). In each

of these cases the child was an adult supporting himself on his own efforts.
36. Page v. Page, 73 N. H. 305, 61 Atl. 356, 6 Ann. Cas. 510 (1905). The court Justifies its holding on the ground that consanguinity is not the test to be applied but rather

the community of interest usually found in a family, concluding that even though the
parties lived in the same house there was no community of interest between the mother
and son. If the test be recognized as valid, then it must be admitted that the court Is coldly
logical in its application thereof.
37. Neal v. Neal, 12 Ky. 930, 15 S. W. 1058 (1891) ; Woods v. Fifth-Third Union Trust
Co., 54 Ohio App. 303, 6 N. E. (2d) 987 (1936); Wessinger v. Roberts, 67 S. C. 240, 45 S.
E. 169 (1903).. Woods v. Fifth-Third Union Trust Co., supra, displays a fine disdain to-

ward the majority view by even failing to consider it in reaching its conclusions which it
based upon the moral duty owed to a mother by her son.
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sumed to have been gratuitously bestowed.s To infer, as the majority rule
seemingly does, that the physicaZ severance of the child from the family circle,
changes the attitude and sentiment of the child in services thereafter rendered
is strangely at variance with the experience of humanity. Indeed, the necessities of the parent and the corresponding urge of the child to aid the parent
may be accentuated by the withdrawal of the child from the parent's home.
To apply a "tape-measure" test to so delicate and sentimental a relationship is
hardly consistent with factual experience in this situation. It is submitted,
therefore, that the sounder view is that which recognizes that parents and children custoniarily render services without expectation of payment regardless
of whether or not they are living together as a family.
In some of those courts which require a living together, however, the
relationship of parent and child seems to carry with it the inference that they
are living together, because it is usual for parents and children to reside in
the same household 3 9 It therefore devolves on the party seeking to recover
for services to show that in fact no household relationship does exist. 40
Adopted children attain the same rights and position within the home as
natural children and the same presumption of gratuity applies.4 By force of
adoptive proceedings the adopting parent stands in the place of the natural
parent. A somewhat different situation applies, however, in those cases in
which the child is not adopted but an arrangement is made between the child's
natural parents and those entrusted with his care. A typical situation is one
in which a child is placed in a private home under an agreement to provide for
his education, but where no express provision is made for compensation for
his labors by the family into which he has been taken. In such instance the
child is not allowed to recover, the relationship between the parties being such
that a family relationship is inferred.2 New York, however, has indicated a
33. Wessinger v. Roberts, 67 S.C. 240, 45 S. E. 169 (1903).

39. This is to be gathered from the statements in the various cases that where there
is a lesser degree of relationship than that of parent and child there must be a poitive
showing of the household relationship. Moore v. Renick, 95 Mo. App. 202, 62 S. W. 936
(1902); Disbrow v. Durand, 54 N. J. L. 343, 24 Atl. 545 (1892). It is further borne out

by the fact that although Pennsylvania is one of those states which considers the living
together essential between parent and child, Steel v. Steel, 12 Pa. St. 64 (1849), it still
states that the relationship alone is sufficient to overcome the presumption that services are
to be reimbursed. In re Gibb's Estate, 266 Pa. 435, 110 At. 236 (1920). The inference
therefore is that the parent-child relation carries with it the implication of a household
relationship.
40. See note 35, supra.
41. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw (1916) § 112: "They must present... an agreement on the
part of the foster parents or parent to adopt and treat the minor as his, or her or their
own lawful child... !' §§ 110 to 115 of the Domestic Relations Law give the full requirements of adoptive proceedings.

In view of the fact that adoption gives the adopted child the legal status of a natural
child in its new home, it is logical to find that the status of adoption carries the same presumption of gratuity of services which obtains between natural parent and child. Hogg
v. Laster, 56 Ark. 382, 19 S.W. 975 (1S92); Wyley v. Bull, 41 Kan. 205, 20 Pac. 855
(1339); Walker v. Tyler, 23 Colo. 233, 64 Pac. 192 (1901).
42. Rosky v. Schmitz, 110 Wash. 547, 133 Pac. 493, 10 A. L. R. 139 (1920).
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tendency to view such a situation in another light; for where a natural father
left his child with the plaintiff under an agreement whereby the plaintiff was
to keep the child until it had attained full age, the court held that no family
relationship existed between the plaintiff and the child, and consequently no
presumption of gratuity applied. 43 The court apparently interpreted the
mutual agreement as merely establishing the status of a boarder. A child
has also been held not to be a member of a family, where, although she lived
and ate with a family not related to her, she was not allowed to attend school,
had received no education, had done continuous work as a servant, and4 after
arriving at a certain age, had been obliged to supply her own clothing.
The opinions of the courts abound in statements that as the degree of blood
relationship decreases the presumption of gratuity grows weaker and is more
easily rebuttable. 45 Such a presumption applies between brother and sister,
once a living together in the family relation is shown to exist, although the
relationship of brother and sister is not of itself sufficient to carry with it
the implication that a living together in the same household exists, as in the
case of parent and child. 46
More remote degrees of blood relationship, always assuming that the relatives are residing in the same household, have been sufficient to raise a presumption that services performed in the domestic circle are not inspired by expectation of monetary payment. So it has been held that such implication of
gratuity attaches to benefits passing between aunt and uncle,4 7 between cousins, 48 and even between brother-in-law and sister-in-law."4
As to an adult person living in the family relationship, although not related
by blood, marriage or adoption, no decisions have been discovered discussing
Keener's statewhether or not the presumption of gratuity would apply."
ment that the source of the presumption is the household and not the blood
relationship, if taken in its literal aspect, so as to include strangers to the
blood, has only the support of dicta from the decided cases.6" Indeed there
are cases which indicate a reluctance to follow such a view.6"
43. Gordon v. Wyness, 169 App. Div. 659, 155 N. Y. Supp. 162 (2d Dep't 1915). The
court in this case construed the facts to raise an implied in fact contract.
44. Doremus v. Lott, 49 Hun 284, 1 N. Y. Supp. 793 (1888).
45. Hill v. Hill, 121 Ind. 255, 23 N. E. 87 (1889); Shane v. Smith, 37 Kan. 55, 14 Pac.
477 (1887); Thornton v. Grange, 66 Barb. 507 (N. Y. 1873); Gorrell v. Taylor, 107 Tenn.
568, 64 S. W. 888 (1901).
46. Disbrow v. Durand, 54 N. J. L. 343, 24 AtI. 545 (1892). See note 39, supra.
47. Riley v. Riley, 38 W. Va. 283, 18 S. E. 569 (1893).
48. Reeves' Estate v. Moore, 4 Ind. App. 492, 31 N. E. 44 (1892). But see to the contrary, Gallagher v. Vought, 8 Hun 87 (N. Y. 1876).
49. Carpenter v. Weller, 15 Hun 134 (N. Y. 1878).
50. The reference to an adult person does not include those adults who were adopted into
the family as children and who continued to live in the family relationship after attaining
maturity. See note 41, supra.
51. The principal case relied upon by Keener to support his statement is Disbrow v.
Durand, 54 N. J. L. 343, 24 Atl. 545 (1892). KEuNER, QuAsi-CoNT.ACTrS (1893) 319n.
But in that case the blood relationship of sister and brother was present. Likewise are
dicta, statements from other cases cited in Disbrow v. Durand, supra.
52. This trend is indicated by such cases as allowed recovery against a father-in-law,
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B. Husband and Wife
Arising out of the common law concept of the unity of husband and wife, 34
with its denial to the wife of the right to hold property in her own name,5
and her inability to contract with her husband sr flow certain ramifications applicable to the present question. A wife was never able to contract with her
spouse for compensation for domestic services performed by her in the scope
and fulfillment of the husband-wife relationship. The same rule applied to
those services performed by the wife, which, while not strictly domestic (such
as helping her husband in his work in the field), were nonetheless not entirely of the commercial natureY0 Passing on to those services which were
dearly of a non-domestic quality we find that the common law disability still
prevented an express contract between the husband and wife because of the
husband's right to her services.57 Even the so-called enabling acts have not
provided a clear cut departure from the common law rule. While it is true
that the majority of the jurisdictions which have passed such legislation
have interpreted it to allow the contracting between husband and wife for
business services,5 s nevertheless the minority view refuses to concede that the
common law right of the husband to his wife's services has been nullified by
these acts. 9 Where, however, the husband chances to be a member of a
Johnson v. Tait, 97 Misc. 48, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1916); a step-mother-in-law,
Hardiman v. Crick, 131 Ky. 358, 115 S. W. 236 (1909). These cases were decided on the
ground that the relationship was too remote to give rise to the presumption.
53. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611 (1910); White v. Wager, 25 N. Y. 328 (1862);
Scnousrat, LAw oF Domrsrc RxLOTioxs (Blakemore's ed. 1921) § 4.
54. The husband had a right to the possession and control of the wife's real property.
Turner v. Heinberg, 30 Ind. App. 615, 65 N. E. 294 (1902); Sharp v. Baker, 51 Ind. App. 547
(1911); In re Riva, 83 N. J. Eq. 200, 90 AtU. 669 (1914). He had a right to the control
of her personalty when he reduced it to possession. White v. Clasby, 101 Bo. 162, 14
S. W. 180 (1890); George v. Cutting, 46 N. H. 130, 88 Am. Dec. 19S (1865); Knapp v.
Smith, 27 N. Y. 277 (1863).
55. National Granite Bank v. Tyndale, 176 Mlass. 547, 57 N. E. 10 (1900); Lossee v.
Ellis, 13 Hun 635 (N. Y. 1878).
56. Whitaker v. Whitaker, 52 N. Y. 368 (1873).
57. This because of the husband's right to her services, whether domestic or otherwke.
McClintic v. McClintic, 111 Iowa 615, 82 N. W. 1017 (1900); Cregin v. Brooklyn Crosstown R. R., 75 N. Y. 192 (1878); Standen v. Pennsylvania R. R., 214 Pa. 189, 63 Atl. 467

(1906).
58. Moore v. Crandall, 205 Fed. 689 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913) (clerk in store); In re Davidson, 233 Fed. 462 (N. D. Ala. 1916) (saleslady); Tuttle v. Shutts, 43 Colo. 534, 96 Pac.
260 (1908) (cook); Roche v. Union Trust Co., 52 N. E. 612 (Ind. App. 1899) (clerk in
store); It re Cormick, 100 Neb. 669, 160 N. W. 989 (1916) (office assistant); Nuding v.
Urich, 169 Pa. 289, 32 Atl. 409 (1895) (cook).
59. In re Kaufman, 104 Fed. 768 (E. D. N. Y. 1900); Mott v. Mott, 107 Me. 481, 79
AtI. 900 (1911) ; Blaechinska v. Howard Mission, 130 N. Y. 497, 29 N. E. 755 (1892). N.Y.
Doms. REL. LAw (1909) § 51 would seem to alleviate this disability if construed liberally for
it states: "A married woman has all the rights in respect to property, real or personal, and
the acquisition, use, enjoyment and disposition thereof, and to make contracts in respect
thereto with any person, including her husband, and to carry on any business, trade or
occupation, and to exercise all powers and enjoy all rights in respect thereto and in respect
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partnership, or an officer of a corporation and in his official capacity hires his
wife to work for the partnership or corporation, there is no doubt that such
contract is valid, provided that the husband is not entitled to all the property
and earnings of his wife.60
It would seem that the majority view is the sounder, in permitting the
husband and wife to contract directly for business purposes, 0' especially in
view of the relaxation of the common law restrictions upon the wife. New
York has recently gone a step further in that direction by permitting married
couples to sue each other for personal torts.0 2 While it is true that the disability with regard to torts under the common law rule was not put on the
same basis as that prohibiting contracts for business services,03 yet the general
trend is away from restriction and in favor of a more equal status between
husband and wife. For services outside the home were never required of a
wife. The husband could not force her to perform them." It was a matter
of choice with the wife as to whether she would or what not perform them. If
she did, however, the husband was entitled to the benefit of them. Since she
owes him no duty to perform business services, they should be permitted to
constitute valid consideration for an express contract.
In the light of this common law background, it should not be difficult to
anticipate the rule in quasi-contracts that services rendered by a husband to
a wife are so performed in the interest of the marriage relationship and are
therefore deemed gratuitous. 65 And this is so even though the services she
performs are in the husband's business.66 Indicative of the difficulty of reto her contracts, and be liable on such contracts, as if she were unmarried. . . ." But
In re Kaufman, supra, declares that this does not change the rule in New York, because, It
argues, this section only applies to the acquiring of property, not to the creation thereof.
And if this statute were interpreted as changing the common law then it would enable the
wife to contract with her husband for domestic as well as commercial services. In the absence of an authoritative declaration by the New York Court of Appeals, it must be admitted there is some doubt as to the effect of this section. See note 68, infrez.
60. Powers v. Fletcher, 84 Ind. 154 (1882) (wife contracted with the firm of which her
husband was a partner. He had released all claims to her services); Baker v. Jewel Tea
Co., 152 Iowa 72, 131 N. W. 674 (1911) (husband was officer of a corporation and wlfo
was not bound to continue to aid him); Adams v. Curtis, 4 Lans. 164 (N. Y. 1870) (wife
allowed to sue members of firm, including husband, for services rendered).
61. There is nothing repugnant to public policy in permitting husband and wife to contract with each other for business purposes outside their marital relationship. The possibility of fraud against third parties is just as inherent in the parent-child relationship, yet
that does not prevent them from expressly contracting for rendition of services. See note
139, infra.
62. N. Y. Domr. RE. LAw (1909) § 57, as amended by the Laws of 1937, c. 669 § 1.
63. The disability to sue for personal torts was based upon the common law concept of
unity. Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644 (1882). The inability to contract for services was
based on the common law right of the husband to his wife's services. See note 57, supra.
64. Blaechinska v. Howard Mission, 130 N. Y. 497, 29 N. E. 755 (1892).
65. Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N. E. 892 (1888); Sanders v. Ragan, 172 N. C
612, 90 S. E. 777, L. R. A. 1917B 683 (1916); Monahan v. Monahan, 77 Vt. 133, 59 At].
169 (1904).
66. Dorsett v. Dorsett, 188 N. C. 354, 111 S. E. 541 (1922).
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moving the presumption of gratuity is the case of Martin v. Bronx County
Trust Company,67 wherein the plaintiff, whose husband was a lodging house
keeper, cleaned and managed daily two eight-apartment lodging houses, in
addition to her domestic duties. Yet the court stated that, granting without
conceding that quasi-contractual recovery might be allowed where services were
extraordinary,' 8 the services in that instance were not so extraordinary as to
warrant recovery. It may be assumed that if the services in the Martin case
were not extraordinary, then no services will ever be so considered, and the
court is stating by implication that it will never allow recovery on an implied
contract between husband and wife.
While it is true that the fact that husband and wife may not expressly
contract for commercial services should not of itself constitute a bar to quasicontractual recovery,0 9 yet the policy motivating the application of the doctrine
in regard to express contracts, is apparently carried over to quasi-contracts,
and because the husband has in the past possessed the right to her services
regardless of their nature, the courts will not thereby consider him unjustly
enriched. It is submitted that the same reason for allowing husband and wife
to expressly contract for commercial services, suggested supra, i.., the equalizing of the position of the wife in modem society, should militate for recovery
by her when she performs extraordinary services outside the home. Certainly
the type of services should be the deciding factor. One case at least, has held
that for services rendered to her husband in his business as a bookkeeper, a
wife may be entitled to the benefit of the presumption that her services were
to be recompensed. 70 This case, at the present stage of the development of
the emancipation of woman, would seem, however, to be the exception.
Another problem concerning the marital state arises where services are rendered under an illegal marriage. Where the wife was induced to enter the
relation through the fraud of her husband there is a conflict. The majority
rule allows her to pursue an action in quasi-contract, on the theory that the
husband has been unjustly enriched, and that regardless of her belief, an actual
husband and wife relationship does not exist and the presumption of gratuity
should not be applied. 71 The minority view on the other hand, closely scrutinizes
the actual intent of the wife, holding that regardless of the fact that the marriage was not valid, she nevertheless intended to perform the services gratuitously. Hence, under this view she is permitted to bring an action in tort
67. 237 App. Div. 246, 260 N. Y. Supp. 344 (1st Dep't 1932).

68. Merrell, .. dissenting, pointed out that not one of the cases in New York had been
decided prior to the passage of § 51 of the Domestic Relations Law and indicated his belief that the New York courts would follow the example set by their sister states and allow husband and wife to contract for the payment of a reasonable compensation for unusual and extraordinary services outside the household duties.
69. This from the very nature of quasi-contract, which arose apart from contract, in order to prevent unjust enrichment. See note 5, supa.
70. In re Cox, 199 Fed. 952 (D. D. N. M. 1912).
71. Sanders v. Ragan, 172 N. C. 612, 90 S. E. 777, L. R. A. 1917B 683 (1916); In re
Fox, 178 Wis. 369, 190 N. W. 90 (1922). The modem trend would seem to favor this
view. REsTATEmExNT, REsniunox (1937) § 40.
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equitable rule, for it would probably be extended to protect the wife because
the husband was unjustly enriched. The minority view, basing its holding
on the malice of the husband instead of the theory of unjust enrichment, where
the husband is guilty of fraud, finds itself without a justification for allowing
recovery to the plaintiff when the husband is 73not guilty of malice, and thus
the plaintiff may not recover for her services.
Where a meretricious relationship exists, however, and services are performed
in the furtherance of that relationship, there can be no recovery on an implied
in law obligation. 74 The law will refuse to allow any benefit to arise from
a cohabitation which violates principles of morality and is inherently opposed
to public policy. It must be apparent, however, that these services were clearly
rendered in furtherance of the illicit relationship and were not merely incidental
thereto. Where, for example, the original cause of the woman's living together
in the man's home was to act as his housekeeper or nurse, and she faithfully
rendered such services, then the fact that they lived together in concubinage
is considered as immaterial in so far as recovery for services rendered is
concerned; and the value of the services appearing, the plaintiff may recover
as in the ordinary quasi-contractual situation.Y5
A further relationship, not that of husband and wife, but closely analogous,
is that between an affianced couple. In view of the approaching marital status,
it would be inequitable to consider them as strangers performing services in
anticipation of remuneration from the other party. Therefore where services
are rendered by a fiancee, provided they are not so rendered in consideration
of a promise of marriage, 76 but on account of the motives of love and affection
between the parties so situated, the law will presume that they were intended
Nor should it make any difference that the fiancee subseas gratuities. 77
78
died.
quently

72. Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N. E. 892 (1888); Blossom v. Barrett, 37
N. Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747 (1868). Where fraud on the part of the husband is present,
this is the more strictly logical point of view, for the wrong to the wife is complete when
the illegal marriage has been performed. While subsequent circumstances may result In
damages, they cannot change the nature of the wrong.
73. Nicely v. Howard, 195 Ky. 327, 242 S. W. 602 (1922). The court did not salve
the wounds caused by this failure of equity by hinting that had there been an express contract for the woman's services it would have allowed recovery.
74. Succession of Pereuilhet, 23 La. Ann. 294, 8 Am. Rep. 595 (1871); Rhodes v.
Stone, 63 Hun 624, 17 N. Y. Supp. 561 (1892); Emmerson v. Botkin, 26 Okla. 218, 109
Pac. 531 (1910).
75. Succession of Pereuilhet, 23 La. Ann. 294, 8 Am. Rep. 595 (1871). The rationale
behind the holding in such instances is that it violates the equitable sense of the courts to
decree that the employer, if allowed to prevail, would be exempt from liability for household services which form the major part of this relationship.
76. Clary v. Clary, 93 Me. 220, 44 Atl. 921 (1899). The reason for the exception
where services are in consideration of marriage is that necessarily there must have been an
express contract present, for which the services were a consideration.
77. La Fontain v. Hayhurst, 89 Me. 388, 36 Atl. 623 (1896).
78. Newhall v. Knowles, 28 R. I. 348, 67 AtI. 365 (1907). Where, however, the flanc6
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An interesting situation arises where there is a conflict between presumptions
due to the fact that the daughter of the family has been secretly married
while continuing to live with her father, who took care of her and incurred
expenses in her behalf. Seeking to recover from the husband for the value
thereof on the ground of marital duty,70 the father is faced by the presumption
that services rendered by one member of the family to another are deemed
gratuitous. 80 It has been held that the conflicting presumptions cancelled
each other, and the jury reached the conclusion that the husband, under the
circumstances should be made liable. 81

IL

COMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

A. CorporateDirectors
A corporation is "'an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law."82 Necessarily, therefore, this fictional entity must
operate through human agencies. This accounts for the existence of the board
of directors. Because their position is endowed with greater powers than the
mere performance of ministerial functions and calls for the exercise of discretion with respect to the carrying on of the corporate activities,3 3 their office
is enveloped in a highly fiduciary atmosphere, and is therefore subject to
abuse.84 In the field of corporate activities, their personal advantage must be
submerged and the single objective of corporate advancement constantly followed. For this reason they are commonly referred to as "trustees," although
strictly speaking there is no actual trust situation present.8 5
subsequently breaches the contract of marriage, a possible analogy might be drawn between
the rendition of services and the gift of an engagement ring. The latter has been considered in the nature of a conditional gift, given with the understanding that the party
who breaks the contract must return the ring. Jacobs v. Davis, [1917] 2 K. B. 532.
Applying this reasoning to the case of pre-marital services, it might be argued that the
courts should consider services performed by a fiancde as conditioned upon the fulfillment
by the fiancie of his part of the obligation, and that a failure to do so should permit the
fianc6e to recover for those services.
79. Benjamin v. Dockham, 134 Mass. 418 (1833); Hatch v. Leonard, 165 N. Y. 435
(1901). In such instances the courts work out a "compulsory agency". Keener, however,
would put it on other grounds, namely, that the plaintiff had performed the legal obligation of the defendant in the performance of which the public has an interest. Kmam,
QUAs-CoaNTRAcrs (1S93) 346. In this view the Restatement is in accord with him. RESTATEa3NT, REsTrTToN (1937)

§ 113.

80. See note 27, supra.
81. Fisher v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 141 N. E. 875 (1924).
82. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636 (U. S. 1819).
83. 1 MoaAwarz, PRIVATE CoRPORATIoNs (2d ed. 1886) § 516.
84. Sargent v. Kansas & Midiand R. R., 48 Kan. 672, 29 Pac. 1063 (1892); Smith v.
Hurd, 12 Met. 371 (Mass. 1847).
85. Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N. Y. 1868). The directors are, however,
treated as trustees in that they cannot dispose of the trust property so as to foster and caue
their individual interests to flourish at the stockholders' expense. Hoyle v. Plattsburgh &
Montreal R. R., 54 N. Y. 314 (1873). Nor may they bind the corporation to a contract
made with themselves personally. Metropolitan Elevated Ry. v. Manhattan Ry., 11 Daly
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No man is forced to become the director of a corporation and the interest
that the directors have in the stock together with other benefits they may
80
derive incidentally are supposed to be sufficient recompense for their services.
The law properly hesitates to assume that a director, alive to the betterment
of corporate affairs, is expecting to be paid for every activity not squarely and
clearly within the scope of his duties as a director. In the absence of an
express contract, therefore, there will be no implication that they are to be
reimbursed beyond contractual or statutory compensations for any valuable
services they may perform within the scope of their official duties.87 The
necessity of the express contract for services within the scope of their normal
duties is to prevent an abuse of the fiduciary relationship in which they stand
to the stockholders. 88 So in the absence of an express contract for compensation a director, who is elected president of a corporation and performs merely
the normal duties of a president, may not recover therefor; 80 nor may one acting
as treasurer under the same circumstances recover.0 0 Attorney's services in collecting on a promissory note for the corporation rendered by the president,
where the by-laws expressly provided against the payment of a salary to the
01
officers, are insufficient to raise an implied in law contract.
Where a director of a corporation is authorized by the board of directors,
acting within their powers to engage in some work clearly outside the normal
scope of his activities, 92 and the surrounding circumstances negative the belief
that it was to be rendered gratuitously, then the law may imply a promise to
pay the reasonable value of those services.0 3 Necessarily there must have been
an intent on the part of the director performing this work to submit a bill
therefor. Whether or not the other directors who authorized him to perform
the work intended to pay him is apparently unimportant, so long as it should
have been reasonably apparent to them than any undertaking of such a task
it the impression that be was
would necessarily convey to the party performing
4
to be reimbursed for his achievements.0
373, 14 Abb. N. C. 103 (N. Y. 1884). Nor may they represent the corporation In any
dealings in the outcome of which they have an interest. Munson v. Syracuse G. & C.
R. R., 103 N. Y. 58, 8 N. E. 355 (1886).

86.

Kilpatrick v. Penrose Ferry Bridge Co., 49 Pa. St. 118, 88 Am. Dec. 497 (1865).

87. Bassett v. Fairchild, 132 Cal. 637, 64 Pac 1082, 52 L. R. A. 611 (1901); Alexander
v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 233 N. Y. 300, 135 N. E. 509 (1922); Wood v. Lost
Lake Manufacturing Co., 23 Ore. 20, 23 Pac. 848 (1890).
88. See note 84, supra.
89. Lowe v. Ring, 123 Wis. 370, 101 N. W. 698 (1904).
90. Kilpatrick v. Penrose Ferry Bridge Co., 49 Pa. St. 118, 88 Am. Dec. 497 (1865).
91. Henry Wood's Sons Co. v. Schaefer, 173 Mass. 443, 53 N. E. 881 (1899).
92. Recovery was allowed in the following instances because the court found that the
services were not within the ordinary nature of the director's work, and were so far removed therefrom as to indicate an intent to recover compensation; services performed by
a director, acting as attorney for the corporation, Taussig v. St. Louis & K. Ry., 166 Mo.
28, 65 S. W. 969 (1901); acting as a general manager in charge of a ranch, Corinne Mill
Canal and Stock Company v. Toponce, 152 U. S. 405 (1894); acting as general manager,
superintendant, and treasurer, Fitzgerald & Mallory Construction Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137
U. S. 98 (1890).
93. Pew v. First National Bank, 130 Mass. 391 (1881). See also note 92, supra.
94. See note 93, supra.
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However, a stockholder of a corporation, not occupying the position of trust
of a director, may recover for services rendered to a corporation at request, even
though there is no express contract for compensation 0 Since he stands in no
fiduciary relation toward the other stockholders an implied contract will arise
for any valuable services performed by him on behalf of the corporation, so long
as there is nothing present in the transaction to negative an intent to recover
compensation for such services.
B. Partnership
A partnership is a relationship created between persons carrying on a business
owned in common, by contract, either express or implied, with the goal of sharing the profits to be gained from the business.90 There are some strong elements
smacking of the fiduciary character in the dealings between partners, engaged
as they are in common enterprise.9 7 Because of the fact that he directly
shares in the profits of the firm and has a personal interest in the result of the
firm's business, each partner is presumed to devote his time to the advancement
of the partnership affairsns A mere inequality in the amount of services is
sometimes disregarded, even in situations where one partner virtually assumes
control of the entire business of the firm.9 0 Premised upon such foundations
of unremitting and unselfish labor in the interest of the partnership, it should
not be difficult to foresee that the presumption of gratuity which applies to the
directors of a corporation also applies to the members of a partnership. For
services performed in his capacity as partner, he may not recover in quasicontract. 00 He may only prevail on the basis of an express agreement,' 0 ' or
under102an implied in fact contract arising from the custom of partnership dealings.
There are certain instances in which the partner is allowed to recover
on an implied in law contract, provided such services are clearly beyond those
95. Ejorth Oil Co. v. Curtis, 25 Wyo. 1, 163 Pac. 362 (1917).
(1911) 1. "A partnership is an association or two or more
96. G=Ox, PAnRmsmm
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit?' N. Y. PA=,Txsm Lw (1919)

§ 10.
97. An individual partner may act as agent of the partnership and bind it by his act.
PA soxs, PnTa-mLsm (4th ed. 1893) § 5. A partner who is engaged in a business conflicting with his interest in the partnership is liable to his co-partners for a proportionate
share of the profits secretly made thereby. lanufacturer's National Bank v. Cox, 2 Hun
572 (1873), aff'd 59 N. Y. 659 (1874). A co-partner purchasing another partner's share
in a firm is under an obligation to reveal all information in his ken concerning the affairs
of the firm which is not known to the co-partner, or the sale is voidable. Joseph v.
langos, 192 Iowa 729, 185 N. W. 464 (1921).
98. Lindsey v. Stranahan, 129 Pa. St. 635, 18 At. 524 (1889).
99. Even where a surviving or liquidating partner performs all the work in winding
up the partnership affairs, there will be no implication of compensation for so doing.
Brown's Appeal, 89 Pa. St. 139 (1879). Cf. note 106, infra.
10o. Roediger v. Reid, 133 Wash. 608, 234 Pac. 452 (1925).
101. Denver v. Roane, 99 U. S. 355 (1878); Osement v. McElrath, 68 Cal. 466, 9 Pac.

731 (1886).
102. Morris v. Griffin, 83 Iowa 327, 49 N. W. 846 (1891); Rains v. Weller, 101 Kan.
294, 166 Pac. 235, L. R. A. 1917F 571 (1917).
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3

The one apparent re-

required of him in his normal partnership activities10
04

The New York cases disquirement is that these services be extraordinary.
close a peculiar unwillingness to grant a partner quasi-contractual relief.
In Levy v. Leavitt'0 5 a partner, with only a 20% interest in the partnership
exerted himself strenuously, even travelling to Europe, in order to sell perishable property of the partnership. Yet the court held that his services were not
sufficiently removed from the normal scope of reasonable partnership activities
to warrant an implied in law contract, pointing out that up until 1931 there had

only been one recovery allowed by a partner in New York for extraordinary
services. To hold, as this case apparently does, that men make such tremendous
efforts without any expectation of reimbursement, is to seriously limit the right
of quasi-contractual recovery. The presence of "extraordinary" neglect, on the
other hand, may impel the courts to imply a contract in favor of the other
partners upon whose shoulders the burden has fallen.' 0 0
C.

Employer and Employee

Coming now to the common relationship of employer-employee we find missing from its essence the highly fiduciary quality which distinguished the two

previous commercial relationships. The employee is but the instrument of the
master's will and operates under his master's orders. 01 7 The average employee
is denied that element of discretion in planning and performing his tasks
which marks the director of the corporation or the partner. 0 8 Nonetheless the
103. In the case of Morris v. Griffin, 83 Iowa 327, 49 N. W. 846 (1891), the plaintiff
and the defendant had made an agreement whereby defendant was to serve the partnership
for one year without compensation. Meantime the plaintiff obtained a position elsewhere
and was thus occupied for 11 years, while the defendant ran the entire business. In examining the facts the court concluded that the defendant should be entitled to counterclaim for those services, not solely because he had run the entire business but because
it appeared that he had done more than his 'share of the partnership work and that such
services were far in excess of his ordinary work. In Emerson v. Durand, 64 Wis. 111, 24
N. W. 129, 54 Am. Rep. 593 (1885), under a similar set of facts, one of the partners devoted
himself to an outside position, leaving the other to manage the partnership affairs; the
partner who bore the burden was allowed to recover. It should be noted that neither
of these cases stands for the principle that because one partner did more than the other in
caring for the business, he was entitled to recover. The lack of equality of work was
merely a factor in evidence to determine whether or not the services rendered were such
that it must have been apparent to both that they were not rendered gratuitously.
104. Williams v. Pedersen, 47 Wash. 472, 92 Pac. 287, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 384 (1907).
105. Levy v. Leavitt, 257 N. Y. 461, 178 N. E. 758 (1931).
10d6. This would refer to a refusal or failure to perform on the part of one of the
partners of some specific duty. Thus, in Miller v. Hale, 96 Mo. App. 427, 70 S. W. 258
(1902), where the partners had divided certain work between them the refusal of the one
partner to perform, entitled the other partner to compensation. And in Marsh's Appeal,
69 Pa. St. 30, 8 Am. Rep. 206 (1871), the failure of the partner to perform financial services for the partnership resulted in a recovery for the co-partner. See also RowLFY, MOD(1916) § 356.
ms
Em LAw OF PA ESM
107. State v. Levine, 79 Conn. 714, 66 AtI. 529 (1907)
108. See notes 83 and 97, supra.
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same presumption of gratuity applies. 1°9 The salary of a servant is presumed to
cover anything which he normally does in his day's work. As each case depends
upon its facts the decisions are in a somewhat unsettled state. Generally the
claims made by salaried employees may be divided into three categories: (1)
cases wherein the servant performs work of a different nature from that for
which he contracted, (2) cases wherein the servant works in excess of the customary number of hours, and (3) cases wherein the overtime work is of a dissimilar nature from the employee's ordinary labor. In the first type of work
the test applied in quasi-contract is the similarity or dissimilarity of the work
°
performed to the tasks which the servant was originally employed to perform.
and
pera
character
He must show that the services requested were of such
formed under such circumstances as to lead to no other belief on his part than
that he was to be permitted to recover extra compensation therefor, and on the
employer's part that such services should reasonably create in the latter's mind
the expectation of payment."' This is also true of the third classification. 2
As to the second type of work (overtime labor of the same nature as the employee's ordinary work) in the absence of an express contract, an employee may
not recover in quasi-contract, since the courts feel that there is nothing in overtime of itself to indicate an intent to recover therefor." 3
Some courts consider more than the mere nature of the work in deciding
whether an employee should recover. They make as the test the circumstances
and transactions surrounding the parties and attempt to work out from their
actions whether or not there was an intent to charge for the services.U 4
The difficulty in determining what constitutes work outside the scope of the
employee's ordinary labor is revealed by the conflicting results in some of the
cases. On one hand an employee active as a stenographer and bookkeeper was
allowed to recover for extra services rendered in collecting accounts;l 1 r on the
other hand, in Robinson v. Munn,"01 a housekeeper was prevented from re109. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. Louis Ry. v. Marable, 189 Ind. 278, 126 N. E. 849 (1920);
Cooper v. Brooklyn Trust Co., 109 App. Div. 211, 96 N. Y. Supp. 56 (2d Dep't 1905).
110. Leahy v. Cheney, 90 Conn. 611, 98 At. 132, L. R. A. 1917D 809 (1916); Voorhees
v. Combs, 33 N. J. L. 494 (1869); Mathison v. N. Y. C. & H. Ry., 72 App. Div. 254, 76
N. Y. Supp. 89 (3rd Dep't 1902).
111. Middlebrook v. Slocum, 152 Mich. 286, 116 N. W. 422 (1903); Mathieson v.
N. Y. C. & H. Ry., 72 App. Div. 254, 76 N. Y. Supp. 89 (3rd Dep't 1902).
112. Carrere v. Dun, 18 Mdisc. 18, 41 N. Y. Supp. 34 (Sup. CL 1896).
113. Gutweiler v. Lundquist, 200 Mo. App. 526, 207 S. W. 838 (1919).
114. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. Louis Ry. v. Marable, 189 Ind. 278, 126 N. E. 849 (1920).
115.

Quink v. Sunderline, 23 Idaho 363, 130 Pac. 374 (1913).

116. 238 N. Y. 40, 143 N. E. 784 (1924). The court very clearly exprLssed the basis
for this principle: "The inference of an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of
services rendered, which may arise from the mere rendition and acceptance of the service,
cannot be drawn, where, because of the relationship of the parties, it is natural that such
service should be rendered without expectation of pay. [Citihg cases]. Accordingly a
salaried employee cannot ordinarily recover, in addition to his salary, the reasonable value
of services rendered which fall outside the scope of duties of his employment, unless such
services are so distinct from the duties of his employment and of such nature that it would
be unreasonable for the employer to assume that they were rendered without expectation
of further pay." Robinson v. Munn, 238 N. Y. 40, 43, 143 N. E. 784, 785 (1924).
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covering for services rendered as a nurse. It has been said that allowance of
recovery for services outside the normal field of employee's activity should be
sparingly granted"1 ' and from a perusal of the cases it is apparent that this
bit of advice has been taken to heart by the courts.
Where there are statutes fixing maximum hours of work a day, an employer is
not liable to an employee for labor beyond the statutory number of hours, 118
unless it is expressly provided for in the contract of employment, the courts
declaring that the passage of such a statute was not intended to confer such a
right upon an employee." 9
The difference between the type of work performed by a director of a corporation and that performed by the ordinary salaried employee is such that the apparent necessity for the presumption of gratuity in his case is less than in the
two former instances.120 Lacking a position of trust, and working for a fixed
and moderate salary, the employee should be able to insist that the services
which he renders outside of his employment should be paid for. The director
or the partner, on the other hand, is interested in the enterprise-parts of it in
fact-and may properly be compelled to await compensation out of the larger
profits which will follow the successful administration of their executive offices.
III.

SOCIETAL RELATIONSHIPS

Man's journey through life is lightened by the kindnesses of the friendly
heart. For the courts to impress upon such kindly acts, irrespective of surrounding circumstances, the implication that they were motivated by a desire
for personal gain would be in many cases to distort the basic intent behind the
tender of good deeds. 121 Therefore, when a spontaneous service is performed
as an act of kindness and without request, or where the circumstances negative
an intention to seek restitution for services rendered, no promise will be implied. 22 Again where friendly services are performed and as an afterthought
an attempt is made to charge for them there can be no recovery. 123 And where
a friend made daily visits to a sick room,' 24 or invited another friend to accompany her on a trip, 25 the courts consider the relations between the parties and
the nature of the acts and refused to imply an intent to recover therefor. Nor
117.

Mathison v. N. Y. C. & H. Ry., 72 App. Div. 254, 76 N. Y. Supp. 89 (3d Dep't

1902).
118. Schurr v. Savigny, 85 Mich. 144, 48 N. W. 547 (1891); Brooks v. Cotton, 48
N. H. 50, 2 Am. Rep. 172 (1868); Gray v. Hall, 32 Misc. 683, 66 N. Y. Supp. g00 (Sup.

Ct., 1900).
119. Luske v. Hotchkiss, 37 Conn. 219, 9 Am. Rep. 314 (1870).
120. Since he is not endowed with the fiduciary character of a director or a partner,
he should not be subject to the same checks which are placed upon them.
121. See note 13, supra.
122. Joyner v. McMurphy, 26 Ala. 549, 163 So. 533 (1935); Spadoni v. Giaconnazl, 27
Cal. App. 149, 149 Pac. 51 (1915) ; St. Jude's Church v. Van Denberg, 31 Mich. 287 (1875);
Dunbar v. Williams, 10 Johns. 249 (N. Y. 1813).
123. James v. O'Driscoll, 2 Bay 101, 1 Am. Dec. 632 (S. C. 1798).
124. Dallman v. Frank, 1 Cal. App. 541, 82 Pac. 564 (1905).
125. Zane v. De Onativia, 139 Cal. 328, 73 Pac. 856 (1903).

1937J

COMMENTS

will relief in the form of compensation be allowed to one who has performed the
legal obligation of another save in special circumstances."-( As to whether a
charitable institution might recover at a later date from the recipient of charitable services, after the latter has attained a position of economic independence,
the courts are divided. 7 But all agree that in the event that a statute or the
create such liability the institution may prevail
by-laws of the institution 28
and recover for its services.'
Closely allied to those cases of friendly services are those styled emergency
acts, and connected with the preservation of life and property of another from
destruction. Recognizing that in the presence of death all men are more nearly
brothers than at any other time, the common law refused to imply an intent
to charge for non-professional services performed in the saving of a life.m'2
The preservation of property, however, is governed by a more flexible rule, depending upon whether or not the property is saved from impending danger in
1 20
a sudden emergency. In the event of threatened loss, Bartholomnew v. Jackso?3
thus states the rule of quasi-contracts, "If a man humanely bestows his labor
and even risks his life in voluntary aid to preserve his neighbor's house from
destruction by fire, the law considers the service rendered as gratuitous and it
therefore favors no ground of action." Fire and flood are examples of those sudden emergencies which call the brotherhood of man into action without thought
of recompense for their services.' 3'
Where, however, one attempts to reclaim his property, which has been not
only rescued but kept safe for the true owner, the law allows the person so
preserving the property to recover in quasi-contract, not as a reward for the
saving but in compensation for the trouble and expense incurred through hold126. This is to prevent the foisting of an obligation in quasi-contract upon a party by a
volunteer who may often be an intermeddler. Fore v. Haines, 17 N. J. L. 385 (1840);
Everts v. Adams, 12 Johns. 352 (N. Y. 1815); P srATm,,r, Rxsrrrum o (1937) § 2.
Where, however, the legal obligation of another is of such nature, (a) that the public
has a grave interest in its prompt performance, (b) that the person on whom the obligation has been imposed has, with knowledge of the facts, either failed to, or apparently will

fail to perform, and (c) that the intervenor is the proper person to do so. Woomwn,
(1913) § 193; REsTATE_-NnrT, RzsTumOv (1937) § 115. The most common type of case under this classification is that where a school district has failed in its
statutory duty to provide transportation for all children beyond a certain distance from
the schoolhouse. Eastgate v. Osago School Dist., 41 N. D. 518, 171 N. W. 96 (1919); Sommers v. Putnam, 113 Ohio St. 177, 148 N. E. 682 (1925).
127. Denying the right to recovery, Montgomery County v. Ristine, 124 Ind. 242l 24 N.
E. 990 (1890), on the ground that the law refers his reception to charity. Permitting recovery, Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 (18S2), on the ground of the performance of the
legal obligation of another where there is a matter of grave public concern. Accord: Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227 (1817).
128. Arlington v. Lyons, 131 Mass. 328 (1881).
129. WooDwARD, QuAsr-CourraAcrs (1913) § 201 (1).
130. 20 Johns. 28, 11 Am. Dec. 237 (N. Y. 1822).
131. New Orleans, Ft. J. & G. I. R. R. v. Turcan, 46 La. Ann. 155, 15 So. 187 (1894);
Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 28, 11 Am. Dec. 237 (N. Y. 1822); Glenn v. Savage,
14 Ore. 567, 13 Pac. 442 (1887).
Qu.As-Co-N-TRAC
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ing it for the true owner. 132 The distinction between these two forms of service for the benefit of another's property is one which appeals to the instincts.
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS

The courts generally regard the relationships considered above as giving
rise to a presumption of free service between the parties.1a Yet logically it
might be argued that if there is an original presumption that valuable services are
performed under an expectation of reimbursement, then the revelation of the
presence of the fiduciary relationship should merely rebut the original presumption and not of itself raise an independent presumption. Although such a distinction has been labelled academic, 13 4 yet it has been suggested that a fact

situation might arise where a plaintiff might make out a prima facie case if no
presumption of gratuity existed, and under the same facts be non-suited, if the
presumption did exist. 13 5 It must be recognized, however, that from whatever

it springs, the courts still generally spell out a
principle the rationale behind
36
presumption of gratuity.'

The presumption once having arisen, the important problem from the standpoint of the party seeking recovery is the sufficiency of proof necessary to rebut
the implication of gratuity. With the exception of those jurisdictions which
prevent the contracting between husband and wife, 137 there is nothing inherent

in any of the three major types of relationship which prevents the contracting

between parties in respect to business, services and improvements.138 Therefor,

proof of an express contract, it goes without saying, will be sufficient to rebut
the presumption. 30 Indeed, there are some decisions which will only allow
the presumption to be rebutted by such evidence.' 40 They seem to overlook the
fact that in the family relationship at least, the parties are not dealing at arm's
132. Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286 (1871); Amory v. Flynn, 10 Johns. 102 (N. Y.
1813); Sheldon v. Sherman, 42 N. Y. 484 (1870); Great Northern Ry. v. Swaffield, L. R.
9 Ex. 132. (1874). Contra: Watts v. Ward, 1 Ore. 86, 62 Am. Dec. 299 (1854). The preserver of goods in such instance has no lien on them for services and cannot force the
,owner to take them back. The owner may abandon the property without incurring any
liability toward the preserver. "The right to restitution is limited to the reasonable value
of services or things necessary to be supplied in order to preserve the subject matter.
Repairs beyond those essential for such preservation are made officiously and for these there
is no right to restitution." RESTATEMENT, RESnrTuTioN (1937) § 117, comment c.
133. Hogg v. Laster, 56 Ark. 382, 19 S. W. 975 (1892); Hardiman's Adm'r v. Crick,
131 Ky. 358, 115 S. W. 236 (1909) ; Riley v. Riley, 38 W. Va. 283, 18 S. E. 569 (1893).
134. Guild v. Guild, 15 Pick. 129 (Mass. 1833).
135. (1926) 26 CoL. L. REv. 1035.
136. See note 133, supra.
137. See note 59, supra.
138. The commercial relationship is itself a creature of contract, and there were never
any common law disabilities attached to members of a family, except for husband and
wife.
139. Price v. Jones, 105 Ind. 543, 5 N. E. 683 (1885); Harris v. Orr, 46 W. Va. 261, 33
S. E. 257 (1899).
140. Hinkle v. Sage, 67 Ohio St. 256, 65 N. E. 999 (1902); Zimmerman v. Zimmerman,
129 Pa. St. 922, 18 Atl. 129 (1889).
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length and according to the forms of commerce, and that an implied in fact
contract would be more probably the rule rather than the exception. The majority and sounder view permits the jury-in cases involving the family relationship-to consider all the facts in the cases before it and if those facts warrant
such a conclusion, to work out an implied in fact contract on the basis of all
the evidence. 141 No hard and fast rule as to the quantum or kind of evidence
required to rebut the presumption may be laid down, save that a fair preponderance of the evidence must sustain the plaintiff's contention. 4- Necessarily,
in cases of this sort, the facts and equities peculiar to the situation before the
43
court will be the deciding factor.
Certain elements which are considered pertinent in weighing the intent of the
beneficiary and donor of services are: the fact that the party performing the
services kept no books in which the services were listed against the beneficiary's
name, indicative of a lack of intent to charge therefor;' 14" the nature of the
services, whether or not they are the type which a party would render without
expectation of reimbursement; 45 the payment of money to the plaintiff and receipt
thereof without objection, as apparent recognition of full payment for his
services; 146 the statements of the plaintiff evidencing lack of intent to demand
47
reimbursement.
As to the various kinds of business relationship, little may be said of the
type of evidence, which will cause a plaintiff to prevail in the absence of an express contract, since the requirement of "extraordinary" services outside the
scope of the original agreement of employment, must be viewed in the light
of what constitutes the plaintiff's normal duties. He must sustain the burden of
proof and on all the evidence it should be for the jury to say whether or not the
facts are such as to warrant the implication by law of a contract. 48
CONCLUSION

It might be thought that the foregoing limitations upon quasi-contractual
recovery are exceptions to the general rule that where valuable services are rendered to another and he is unjustly enriched thereby, the law will create an implied in law contract to make restitution.149 But from the very equitable
nature of quasi-contractual recovery it becomes apparent that these seeming
141.

In cases of this sort it is for the jury to say from all
the circumstances, whether

or not there was a mutual understanding that the services were to be reimbursed.

See

note 29, supra.

142.

KEE=,

143.

See page 421, supra.

QuAsi-ContActs (1893)

318n.

144. In re Goldrick's W1l, 198 Wis. 500, 224 N. W. 741 (1929). Plaintiff was an experienced business man, and the courts drew from his failure to keep any accounts

for the services which he rendered to his neighbor, the conclusion that he considered that
the remuneration received was payment in full.
145. Frailey v. Thompson's Adm'rs, 20 Ky. 1179, 49 S. W. 13 (1899).
146. See note 144, supra.
147. Hewitt v. Anderson, 56 Cal. 476, 38 Am. Rep. 6S (1880).
148. KEu, QuAs-CoNzmcrs (1893) 318n.
149. See note 6. subra.
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exceptions exist not as tangents or deviations from the general rule but as a
defensible development which in fact preserves the equitable functions of that
rule and keeps it within the bounds of conscience. It is true, however, that one
is not always impressed by the same necessity for the presumption under all the
stated relationships. Reason and humanity dictate that it should be applied in
the case of parent and child and others closely bound by the family relationship, or where the societal relationship inspires action for the benefit of parties
in distress. But it is less clearly indicated where the commercial relation is the
tie uniting the actions of the parties. Even in this setting the powers possessed
by the director of a corporation or by the member of a partnership argue for a
retention of the presumption against reimbursement. In the case of a mere
employee not endowed with the latitude of the fiduciary's calling, it is questionable whether the presumption of gratuity should be retained in its present form.

THE PRACTICE OF THE HEALING ARTS: SoAE REGULATORY PROBLEMS.*

-

Like their brothers the lawyers, the doctors of medicine are considerably concerned over the inroads made in their professional practice.1 The exponents
of healing cults which do not recognize the therapeutic principles and methods
of medical science have succeeded in winning the confidence and loosening the
purse-strings of a substantial number of persons. 2 Medical men profess scorn
for their competitors' techniques3 and apprehension of the results of their
*
It will become apparent to the reader that this paper must of necessity concern
itself to some degree with the scientific merits of the various forms of medical healing.
It is desirable, of course, that an objective approach be made to this problem, especially
by the layman, who is neither desirous nor capable of evaluating the respective claims
advanced by either organized or sectarian medicine. It is only fair to state, however,
that the writer's conclusions are based upon his personal conviction, derived from reading
arguments on both sides, that the medical men present a better case. Nevertheless, an
effort has been made to be impartial, and if the reader detects any bias on any controversial subject, he is earnestly requested to disregard it.
1. There is a striking similarity in the predicament in which both professions find
themselves. Just as lawyers find their practice being whittled away by banks, trust
companies, and title companies, so doctors are confronted with the problems of the
osteopaths, chiropractors, naturopaths, and faith-healers. It was estimated in 1932 that
there were 16,000 chiropractors, 10,000 faith healers, 7,650 osteopaths, and 2,500 naturopaths-almost one-fourth of the total number of practising physicians. REED, TnE HEAL NG
Curs (1932) 1. These figures do not include optometrists, midwives, chiropodists, and
pharmacists, in themselves numbering well over 100,000. PEEBLES, MEDICA= FACILITIES IN
STATES (1929) 16. Members of these groups, however do not profesm to cure
TE UNr
all disease, but only to perform certain services, and this paper will not be concerned with
their activities.
2. It is estimated that over $125,000,000-about 12Lo of the annual fee bill of the physicians--is paid to drugless healers. Chiropractors receive $63,000,000; osteopaths, $42,000,.
000; naturopaths, $10,000,000; and faith healers, $10,000,000. REEM, toc. cit. supra note 1.
MEDiCAL Asso3. E.g., Dr. Morris Fishbein, editor of the JouRxAL oF TE A.inmu
crATioN and HYGEIA, has analyzed the tenets of the healing cults at some length. His conclusions bespeak only the greatest scorn for their theories and dogmas. See especially his
FADS AND QUACKERY In HEALING (1932). Chiropractors counter with statements of repu-

